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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
When Hurricane Hugo hit the Virgin Islands on 
September 17 and 18, 1989, it destroyed the potable water 
delivery system on St. Croix. The Virgin Islands Water and 
Power Authority (WAPA),1 and officials of the United States 
government immediately began efforts to restore water 
service, using fresh water wells. Because the equipment 
being used at each well site was in high demand on the 
island, FitzRoy Gardiner and his company, Western Trading 
Enterprises (Gardiner), were hired to perform security and 
maintenance service at the wells 24 hours a day. The bill 
for Gardiner's services over the following ten weeks came to 
$1,245,178, of which WAPA has paid $616,538. In this 
action Gardiner sought the balance from WAPA. WAPA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. WAPA has the statutory obligation to provide water for the residents 
of the Virgin Islands, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 30 S 105(a). 
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based its refusal to pay on its contention that it did not 
contract with Gardiner but that Gardiner contracted 
instead with the United States. 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
In the days following the hurricane, the United States 
and WAPA worked together to implement a water 
distribution system using about 45 fresh water wells 
located in well fields owned by WAPA. Each well required a 
pump and a generator to power it. From the wells, water 
was pumped into storage tanks and then into pressurized 
distribution lines. These too required pumps and 
generators. The Army Corps of Engineers, along with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and WAPA, 
obtained the necessary equipment, which was apparently 
owned, at least in part, by the federal government. 
 
By early October the new system was in place, but 
security at the wells quickly became a serious problem 
despite a tightly-enforced curfew to prevent violence and 
looting. The lack of electric power on the Island made the 
generators very desirable; the wells themselves were located 
in remote areas, covered with dense vegetation up to six 
and a half feet high. WAPA employees provided security 
services during the first few days of October, until several 
employees were threatened by persons who were attempting 
to steal the generators and pumps. The United States 
Army, the National Guard, and the Virgin Islands Police 
Department refused to provide the necessary 24 hour 
security. WAPA acknowledges that providing the security 
was hazardous work. 
 
Bruce Green, an employee of the United States Geological 
Survey assigned by FEMA to work on the Islands, and 
Romeo Cipriani, Superintendent of the Water Distribution 
System for WAPA on St. Croix, met with Gardiner in early 
October to discuss security at the well fields. Gardiner had 
previously worked for WAPA and was already doing work 
for WAPA on another project. Green and Cipriani reviewed 
the problems at the wells with Gardiner, and Gardiner 
orally agreed to provide both security and maintenance 
services 24 hours a day. According to Bruce Green's 
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deposition, Gardiner was told at this initial meeting that 
WAPA would be reimbursed by the federal government for 
the payments to Gardiner. Gardiner, on the other hand, 
testified that he did not learn this until later. There was no 
written contract. Gardiner began to perform the services 
immediately. He had people in the field within hours. By all 
accounts, Gardiner and his crews were resourceful and 
highly successful. In order to assure uninterrupted service, 
Gardiner constructed shelters for his crews at the wells. His 
crews kept the equipment fueled and performed 
maintenance services such as changing oil, adjusting 
carburetors, and repairing and replacing filters, mufflers, 
starter cords, and other parts. When three generators 
failed, Gardiner replaced them with his own. 
 
On October 25, 1989, Gardiner, Cipriani, and Fred 
Rounsaville of the Army Corps of Engineers met to discuss 
Gardiner's fee for his services. Gardiner agreed to lower his 
rates from $30 to $22.50 per person per hour during the 
day and from $35 to $27.50 per hour at night.2 In a 
memorandum discussing this negotiation, Rounsaville 
wrote that the "charges of $30 and $35 per hour" were 
"excessive and I requested a meeting with Mr. Cipriani of 
WAPA, the contractor and Mr. Green." Rounsaville also 
wrote that he thought the new rates were still too high but 
that "I agreed to the hourly rates" because of the 
"importance of providing drinking water to the residence 
[sic]." Gardiner, according to the memo, threatened to 
withdraw all workers by nightfall if his terms were not met. 
Finally, Rounsaville's memo states that "I discussed this 
with John Swanson and he agreed with my conclusion even 
though the rates were higher than usual the need 
outweighed the costs." 
 
The United States was still unhappy with Gardiner's fees, 
however, and on November 2, 1989, Rounsaville and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. These figures are taken from the district court's opinion at page 6. 
The 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which followed the bench 
trial on damages, reflect that the billing was actually somewhat more 
complicated. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at PP 17-22. The 
billing rates and amount of damages are not at issue on this appeal 
except that WAPA has challenged the award (but not the amount) of 
prejudgment interest. 
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Gardiner agreed to lower the rates to $20 per hour during 
the day and $25 per hour at night, beginning with the sixth 
week of service. WAPA maintains that none of its employees 
participated in this meeting. 
 
As discussed by Green, Cipriani, and Gardiner at their 
initial meeting, Gardiner submitted his invoices to WAPA. 
On November 2, 1989, WAPA paid the invoices, which 
totaled $282,275 for the weeks ending October 7 and 14. 
Gardiner received payment for the last two weeks of 
October, more than $334,000, on approximately November 
7. The checks to Gardiner were signed by Nellon Bowry, 
chief financial officer of WAPA, and Alberto Bruno-Vega, 
Executive Director of WAPA. 
 
On November 21, 1989 the WAPA Governing Board 
passed a resolution that, according to Bruno-Vega's 
deposition testimony, ratified his expenditures in excess of 
$75,000 in the immediate wake of the hurricane. The 
resolution provided in part: 
 
       WHEREAS, in an informal emergency meeting of the 
       Governing Board, and in other meetings of the 
       Governing Board's Finance Committee, since Hurricane 
       Hugo, the Governing Board informally granted the 
       Executive Director the authority to temporarily 
       negotiate, sign and execute contracts and other 
       transactions of the Authority for amounts in excess of 
       $75,000, without prior consent of the Governing Board; 
       therefore, 
       BE IT RESOLVED BY THE GOVERNING BOARD: that 
       the Executive Director of the Authority, Alberto Bruno- 
       Vega, be authorized to negotiate, sign and execute 
       contracts and other necessary transactions of the 
       Authority for amounts in excess of $75,000, without 
       prior consent and knowledge of the Governing Board, 
       during the Authority's emergency efforts to restore 
       service and to repair its facilities from the damage 
       caused by Hurricane Hugo. Said authorization shall 
       terminate upon the entry of a resolution of the 
       Governing Board expressly terminating said temporary 
       authorization. 
 
After paying Gardiner for the last two weeks of October, 
WAPA refused to make any further payments. WAPA paid 
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Gardiner $616,538 in total, covering the first four weeks of 
services. Gardiner billed WAPA a total of $1,245,178 for the 
ten weeks of services. Gardiner testified that he was shown 
a check in the middle of November that had been made out 
to him by a WAPA employee, but that he was told there was 
a problem and it would not be delivered immediately. WAPA 
did not, however, tell Gardiner to stop protecting the wells 
or to seek payment from the federal government. Gardiner 
continued to provide services through the middle of 
December. Beginning in November, WAPA charged its 
customers for the water supplied by the well fields. 
 
Under the system set up for Gardiner's payments, WAPA 
paid Gardiner and then sought reimbursement from the 
United States. WAPA claims that it stopped paying Gardiner 
when it realized that FEMA might not reimburse it for 
Gardiner's services. WAPA has stipulated that each time it 
requested reimbursement for expenses, it had tofile a "form 
No. 270," which stated, in part that "FEMA is not a party 
to this contract." Damage Survey Reports ("DSR"), which 
accompany requests for assistance after a natural disaster, 
were compiled by Fred Rounsaville and submitted to FEMA. 
Although Rounsaville approved Gardiner's rates and told 
WAPA officials that senior FEMA officials approved them as 
well, FEMA initially authorized payment of $830,000 to 
WAPA, more than $400,000 less than Gardiner was owed. 
This figure was further reduced by the Inspector General's 
review of the billing after Gardiner had finished the work. 
After this audit, FEMA agreed to reimburse WAPA a total of 
only $443,000. 
 
II. Procedural Background 
 
Gardiner filed suit against WAPA in November, 1990, in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The complaint 
alleges that WAPA breached a contract with Gardiner when 
it refused to pay for Gardiner's services. 
 
On January 25, 1991, WAPA filed a third party complaint 
against FEMA, the Army Corps of Engineers and the United 
States Geological Society. The third party defendants, along 
with Gardiner, moved to dismiss. The court granted the 
motion on April 17, 1991, in a two page order, which read 
in part: 
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       The third party plaintiff having conceded that the 
       jurisdiction of the third party claim belongs with the 
       United States Claims Court; and 
       It appearing that the United States Claims Court does 
       not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against 
       the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority as that 
       court does not have jurisdiction over suits between 
       private parties [citation omitted]...IT IS...ORDERED 
       that the motion of the third party defendants is 
       granted.... 
 
On July 12, 1991, WAPA moved to "Amend and/or 
Reinstate a Third-Party Complaint and a Cross Claim 
Against the United States of America and to Transfer Entire 
Matter to the United States Claims Court." WAPA argued in 
support of the second motion that under 28 U.S.C. S 1631, 
the district court could transfer the case to the Court of 
Claims after joining the United States as a party. 
 
The district court granted WAPA's motion to amend 
and/or reinstate its third party complaint on June 30, 
1992. The district court reasoned that the transfer was 
appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1406(c). Gardiner 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed and remanded on September 2, 1993. The Court 
of Appeals determined, in part, that "the district court 
relied on 28 U.S.C. S 1406(c) as it existed prior to 1982 in 
transferring this case to the claims court," that this statute 
"was repealed by Congress in 1982," and no longer 
provided the court with authority to transfer the case. The 
Court of Appeals also noted that WAPA did not allege in its 
pleadings that it had a contract with the United States and 
that WAPA therefore did not state "a claim upon which 
relief may be granted by the claims court." 
 
On September 10, 1993, WAPA renewed its earlier 
motion, dated May 10, 1991, to dismiss for failure to join 
an indispensable party, the United States. The district 
court heard argument on the motion on December 20, 
1993, and denied it "for the reasons stated on the record." 
The court stated that "[t]his is a case we've struggled with 
and struggled with, and based on law and a growing equity 
of claims of injustice [sic] compelled and must be denied." 
The court also said that it would let WAPA use "the 
 
                                7 
  
evidence of FEMA assurances" and the evidence of an 
agreement between the plaintiff and the United States "to 
disprove the plaintiff 's claim of a contract between it and 
WAPA." WAPA filed a notice of appeal on January 19, 1994. 
The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on 
November 18, 1994. 
 
The district court granted a motion by Gardiner for 
partial summary judgment on August 17, 1995. The court 
held that Gardiner and WAPA had a binding contract, but 
reserved the issue of damages for trial. After a bench trial 
on January 23 and 24, 1996, the court issued findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on August 14, 1996. The court 
found that WAPA owed Gardiner $628,640 for unpaid 
services performed by Gardiner under the contract and that 
WAPA was liable for prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$377,184. The interest represented 9% simple interest per 
annum from December 9, 1989, to August 8, 1996. The 
court entered judgment for Gardiner in the amount of 
$1,005,824. The court also awarded Gardiner attorney's 
fees and set a briefing schedule to determine the amount. 
WAPA appealed to this Court on September 12, 1996. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction of this case under 48 
U.S.C. S 1612. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of an 
Indispensable Party 
 
WAPA argues that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
19(b) the district court should have dismissed this case 
because the United States is an indispensable party which 
cannot be joined. WAPA maintains that because the United 
States was not a party, WAPA was not able to demonstrate 
that Gardiner contracted with the United States instead of 
with WAPA. WAPA bases this claim in part on the fact that 
it had only limited discovery against the United States. 
WAPA also contends that this action will impact the United 
States because the decision will resolve some of the terms 
of the contract, such as the amount that Gardiner is 
entitled to recover. Finally, WAPA claims that failure to 
include the United States as a party forces WAPA to 
assume the risk of inconsistent obligations. 
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In determining whether a district court should have 
dismissed a case under Rule 19(b) for failure to join an 
indispensable party, we must make a preliminary 
determination that the non-joined party cannot be joined 
under Rule 19(a). Only if a party cannot be joined under 
Rule 19(a), does Rule 19(b) come into play.3 Shetter v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides in part that: 
 
       (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 
       service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
       jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 
as 
       a party in the action if 
 
        (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
       among those already parties, or 
 
        (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
       action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
       person's absence may 
 
         (I) as a practical matter impair or imped the person's ability to 
       protect that interest or 
 
         (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
       substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
       inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
 
       If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that 
the 
       person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff 
but 
       refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a 
       proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects 
to 
       venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the 
action 
       improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. 
 
       (b) Determination by the Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. 
       If a person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be 
       made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
       conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or 
       should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
       indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
       first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
       might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; 
second, 
       the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by 
the 
       shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened 
       or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 
       absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 
an 
       adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
 
(emphasis added). 
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Amerada Hess Corporation, 14 F.3d 934, 941 (3d Cir. 
1993); Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 
11 F.3d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
We exercise plenary reviews over a Rule 19(a) 
determination to the extent that it is based on conclusions 
of law; as to subsidiary findings of fact we apply a clear 
error standard. HB General Corp. v. Manchester Partners, 
L.P., 95 F.3d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Janney, 11 
F.3d at 404). Rule 19(b) determinations are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. HB General Corp., 95 F.3d at 1189. 
 
Even assuming that the United States could not have 
been joined under Rule 19(a), we cannot conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss 
under Rule 19(b). See Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. 
Management, Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 806 (3d Cir. 1994). Under 
Rule 19(b), the district court had to decide whether the 
United States's participation in the litigation was so 
important that "in equity and good conscience the 
action...should be dismissed, the absent person being thus 
regarded as indispensable." The four factors listed in the 
Rule are not exhaustive, but they are the most important 
considerations in deciding whether to dismiss the action. 
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 1608 at 91 (2d Ed. 1986). 
 
The first and second factors under Rule 19(b) are "to 
what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 
might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties," 
and to what extent such prejudice can be avoided. Here, 
there is little danger of prejudice to the absent party -- the 
United States -- if this case goes forward without it. Indeed, 
the United States does not want to become a party to the 
suit, strongly suggesting that its interests will not be 
impeded if the suit goes forward without it. See Sindia 
Expedition v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 895 F.2d 116, 
121 (3d Cir. 1990) (reasoning that Rule 19(a)(2)(I) did not 
apply because New Jersey was "manifestly unconcerned 
with any adjudication in its absence");4 see also Peregrine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The first factor under Rule 19(b) overlaps considerably with the Rule 
19(a) analysis. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 1608 at 91. 
 
                                10 
  
Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 1996). 
Moreover, there is no prejudice to Gardiner in excluding the 
United States. Gardiner can recover fully from WAPA, the 
party with whom Gardiner claims it has a contract. 
 
WAPA, on the other hand, argues that the absence of the 
United States has seriously hampered WAPA's effort to 
show that there was no contract between WAPA and 
Gardiner. WAPA has not, however, come forward with much 
to support this claim. Indeed, as Gardiner points out, 
WAPA deposed a number of federal officials: Fred 
Rounsaville, Edward Orchowski, Steve Singer, Thomas 
Barbee, Adair Martin, David Shriver, Wynn Fuller, Colonel 
Cox, and Gerald Connolly. Despite the depositions, WAPA 
claims that it was unable to obtain relevant "internal 
documents" from the government, but WAPA has not 
presented specific evidence of prejudice. Although we do 
not suggest that WAPA must identify beforehand the 
contents of the documents that it seeks, WAPA must 
nonetheless identify with greater specificity the information 
that it needs. For example, WAPA might, argue that it could 
not show which federal officials had the implied authority 
to contract with Gardiner because it was not given 
information about their jobs and responsibilities. Or WAPA 
might assert that it could not learn who the contracting 
officers on St. Croix were immediately after Hugo hit. WAPA 
has not, however, made any such contention. Given the 
extensive discovery permitted in this case, WAPA should be 
able to identify any missing information with more detail 
than the phrase "internal documents." 
 
WAPA also argues that it "runs the risk of inconsistent 
adjudication of its rights" if the United States is not joined 
because, if Gardiner prevails, WAPA must then pursue a 
remedy against the United States in a different action. The 
risk of inconsistent judgments, although mentioned 
specifically in Rule 19(a)(2)(ii), is relevant under Rule 19(b) 
as well. Schulman, 35 F.3d at 806. In general, however, "a 
defendant's right to contribution or indemnity from an 
absent non-diverse party does not render that absentee 
indispensable pursuant to Rule 19." Janney, 11 F.3d at 
412. In Janney, we considered an agreement in which 
Janney would serve as an advisor to Underwood and its 
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subsidiary, Shepard Niles. Janney sued Shepard Niles, and 
Shepard Niles contended that Underwood, as a co-obligor to 
the contract, was a party to be joined if feasible under Rule 
19(a). If joined, Underwood would have destroyed diversity 
jurisdiction. 
 
We concluded that the outcome of the case would be"res 
judicata or collateral estoppel as between Janney and 
Shepard Niles," but that Janney "remain[ed] free to claim 
contribution or indemnity from Underwood." We went on 
the explain that "a defendant's right to contribution or 
indemnity from an absent non-diverse party does not 
render that absentee indispensable pursuant to Rule 19." 
11 F.3d at 412 (quoting Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association, 844 F.2d 150, 1054 (3d Cir. 1988)). A 
defendant may implead the absent party under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 14, but is not required to do so, 
"and if it does not, its right to bring a separate action for 
contribution or indemnity is unaffected." Id.5 
 
In this case, unlike Janney, the defendant does not have 
the option to implead the absent party because we lack 
jurisdiction over the United States. Indeed, the third-party 
complaint which WAPA filed against FEMA, the Army Corps 
of Engineers, and the United States Geological Society, was 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But the reasoning of 
Janney -- if a defendant does not implead an absent party, 
there is no legal effect on its rights of contribution or 
indemnification -- applies with equal force here.6 WAPA is 
free to pursue any claim it has against the United States in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Some courts, and Wright, Miller & Kane, reason that joint obligors to 
a contract "are treated as Rule 19(a) parties, but are not deemed 
indispensable under Rule 19(b). Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
& Procedure S 1613 at 182-183." 
 
6. WAPA suggests that the terms of a contract between it and the United 
States could be determined in the litigation between WAPA and Gardiner. 
Specifically, WAPA points to the issue of what rates Gardiner was 
entitled to receive. It is not clear, however, how the determination of 
the 
rates in a contract between Gardiner and WAPA necessarily resolves the 
issue of the reimbursement which the United States may have agreed to 
pay WAPA. WAPA, for example, may have agreed to pay Gardiner's high 
rates, while the United States may have contracted with WAPA to 
reimburse standard or reasonable rates. We express no opinion on these 
issues and raise them only to note the problems in WAPA's claim. 
Contrary to WAPA's claim, this litigation will only bind the parties 
involved and those in privity with them; this does not appear to include 
the United States. 18 Moore's Federal Practice, S 132.01[1] (Matthew 
Bender 3d ed.) 
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a separate action. We recognize that this is a less 
convenient remedy for WAPA. Nevertheless, it is a means of 
resolving WAPA's claim of the risk of inconsistent 
obligations. 
 
WAPA's final argument on the issue of prejudice is that 
the district court did not permit it to present its defense 
that Gardiner contracted not with WAPA, but with the 
United States. In support, WAPA points to the district 
court's statements that the involvement of the United 
States was not "material" or "pertinent." These statements 
reflect, however, the district court's conclusion that 
Gardiner had demonstrated that Gardiner and WAPA had a 
contract, making summary judgment appropriate. If the 
district court determined that a contract existed between 
WAPA and Gardiner, Gardiner was entitled to summary 
judgment, regardless of what agreement WAPA may have 
had with the United States. We will consider the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in the next section. We 
note only that whatever "prejudice" may have enured from 
the district court's conclusions on materiality and 
pertinence goes only to the issue of the propriety of 
summary judgment. The district court's statement that 
certain activities by federal officials were not"material" to 
its determination that Gardiner's contract was with WAPA 
was made in the context of the consideration of summary 
judgment and it has no bearing on whether joinder of the 
United States was feasible under Rule 19(b). 
 
The third factor under Rule 19(b) is "whether a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence will be adequate." This 
element allows the court to consider whether the relief it 
may grant will be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff. 
Provident Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 112 
(1968). Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 
S 1608 at 116. This factor weighs, in our view, in favor of 
WAPA. WAPA's claim, as construed by the district court, 
will be resolved in one action. Moreover, as we note above, 
the possibility that the defendant may have a claim for 
contribution or indemnity does not render an absentee 
indispensable. The right to contribution and indemnity 
should not, therefore, be considered to cause inadequacy of 
the resulting judgment. 
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The fourth Rule 19(b) factor, whether the plaintiff has a 
remedy if the action is dismissed, counsels strongly against 
dismissal in this case. WAPA argues that "Gardiner could 
have filed the same action in the Court of Federal Claims, 
where all parties could be joined in one action, for a 
conclusive and mutually consistent resolution of their 
rights and responsibilities." The problem with this 
argument, however, is that Gardiner does not allege that he 
had a contract of any sort with the United States. Gardiner 
has not alleged a cause of action against the United States; 
thus, he does not have a remedy in the Court of Claims. 
Unless Gardiner claims a contractual relationship with the 
United States, the Court of Claims simply has no 
jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reversed Judge Brotman's transfer of the 
case to the Court of Claims for exactly this reason-- that 
court had no jurisdiction over a dispute between WAPA and 
Gardiner. Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, September 2, 1993; Appendix at 2167, 2171-2172. 
WAPA's argument that Gardiner should file in the Court of 
Claims implies that Gardiner has to rewrite his claim to 
assert that his contract was with the United States. Such 
a revision would, however, provide no remedy for the claim 
that Gardiner makes against WAPA for breach of contract. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Rule 19(b) motion. Gardiner would have had to have alleged 
an entirely new cause of action against the United States in 
order to bring this suit in the Court of Claims. Indeed, 
Gardiner would have had to have alleged something that it 
maintains did not exist -- a contract with the United 
States. Moreover, WAPA's claim of prejudice in discovery 
matters, as we have seen, adds little. For these reasons, it 
was well within the discretion of the district court to deny 
WAPA's motion. 
 
IV. Summary Judgment 
 
In granting summary judgment for Gardiner, the district 
court reasoned that neither Cipriani for WAPA nor Green 
for FEMA had the authority to enter into a contract on 
behalf of the parties that they represented. The district 
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court concluded, however, that the actions of Cipriani were 
later ratified by Bruno-Vega and the WAPA Board, resulting 
in an enforceable contract. On the other hand, the court 
reasoned that there "is simply no evidence of ratification of 
the agreement by any other individual who could have 
ratified a contract entered into by Mr. Green." The court 
accordingly granted summary judgment on the issue of 
liability in favor of Gardiner and against WAPA. We exercise 
plenary review. Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
WAPA make three basic arguments that summary 
judgment for Gardiner was error. First, it points to evidence 
that FEMA officials ratified Green's actions and made 
binding the alleged contract between Green and Gardiner. 
Second, WAPA argues that in this emergency situation 
where the United States played a large role in negotiating 
and overseeing the contract, WAPA can recover if it proves 
an implied-in-fact contract, even if no "contracting officer" 
with specific authority to bind the United States approved 
the contract. Finally, WAPA maintains that, even if it had a 
contract with Gardiner, there is evidence that the contract 
included a term that Gardiner would only be paid to the 
extent that WAPA was reimbursed by the government, 
precluding summary judgment for Gardiner. 
 
The government enters into contracts with the public 
through "contracting officers." LDG Timber Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Glickman, 114 F.3d 1140, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") defines a contracting 
officer as "a person with the authority to enter into, 
administer and/or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings." 48 CFR S 2.101 (1996). The 
regulations also provide that "[c]ontracts may be entered 
into and signed on behalf of the Government only by 
contracting officers," 48 CFR S 1.601(a), and that 
"[c]ontracting officers may bind the Government only to the 
extent of the authority delegated to them." 48 CFR S 1.602- 
1(a). Part 4401 of FAR "sets forth policies and procedures 
concerning the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Acquisition Regulation (FEMAAR) System." 48 CFR 
S 4401.000. This part states the qualifications required for 
contracting officers within FEMA and explains that except 
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for "disaster-related activities and unusual circumstances 
as determined by the head of the contracting activity, it is 
policy to delegate contracting officer authority to individuals 
rather than positions." 48 CFR SS 4401.603-2(a) and 
4401.603-3. 
 
As the discussion above makes clear, only those with 
specific authority can bind the government contractually; 
even those persons may do so only to the extent that their 
authority permits. Moreover, a party who seeks to contract 
with the government bears the burden of making sure that 
the person who purportedly represents the government 
actually has that authority: 
 
       Whatever the form in which the Government functions, 
       anyone entering into an arrangement with the 
       Government takes the risk of having accurately 
       ascertained that he who purports to act for the 
       Government stays within the bounds of his authority. 
       The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by 
       Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, 
       properly exercised through the rule-making power. And 
       this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may 
       have been unaware of the limitations upon his power. 
 
Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). 
 
This allocation of risk, the Court reasoned, "does not 
reflect a callous outlook," but instead "merely expresses the 
duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by 
Congress for charging the public treasury," whether those 
conditions appear in the statutes themselves or are part of 
regulations that implement those statutes. Id. at 384-385. 
Other policy grounds supporting this rule were stated more 
recently by the Federal Circuit: "The United States 
Government employs over 3 million civilian employees. 
Clearly, federal expenditures would be wholly 
uncontrollable if Government employees could, of their own 
volition, enter into contracts obliging the United States." 
City of El Centro v. U.S., 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
In this case, Gardiner claims that WAPA's defense that 
Gardiner actually had a contract with the United States, 
not WAPA, is defeated by WAPA's failure to identify a 
contracting officer who could have bound the United States. 
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We agree. It is undisputed that Bruce Green had no such 
authority; neither did Gerald Connolly, the federal 
coordinating officer for the Virgin Islands disaster, or 
Steven Singer, the deputy federal coordinating officer for St. 
Croix. WAPA argues that it has presented evidence of 
ratification of the contract by "senior officials in the FEMA 
disaster relief effort," namely Connolly and John Swanson. 
WAPA has pointed to absolutely no evidence that Swanson 
had the authority to contract on behalf of the government. 
The record is clear that Connolly did not. Although WAPA 
contends it has been unable to get information that it needs 
from the United States during the course of this litigation, 
it deposed at least five FEMA officials and has pointed to no 
unanswered question as to who the contracting officers 
were in FEMA or on St. Croix. Because there is no evidence 
to support WAPA's claim that the contract was ratified by 
someone in the federal government who had the authority 
to do so, summary judgment was appropriate unless, as 
WAPA also argues, the approval of a contracting officer was 
not necessary. 
 
WAPA maintains that no contracting officer needed to 
approve the agreement for the United States because this 
case comes within a "branch of the implied-in-fact contract 
doctrine that applies specifically in emergency situations." 
To prove an implied-in-fact contract, the party alleging that 
contract must show the same elements required in an 
express contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration. See 
Trauma Services Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Proof of an implied-in-fact contract 
comes not from an express agreement, however, but from 
"conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." Id. 
(quoting Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 981, 985 
(1996) (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 
261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923))). Significantly, an implied-in-fact 
contract, like an express contract, must include 
authorization (whether implied or express) by an agent with 
the authority to bind the United States. Trauma Services, 
104 F.3d at 1326; City of El Centro, 922 F.2d at 820. 
 
WAPA argues that the required authorization can be 
implied from the high-ranking officials who tacitly approved 
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the contract and that because this was an emergency 
situation a contracting officer was not required to bind the 
United States. There is, as WAPA maintains, evidence that 
federal officials played a major part in negotiating and 
overseeing Gardiner's contract to provide security and 
maintenance services. This evidence also indicates that the 
federal government may have benefitted from the security 
services because of its ownership of the generators. Federal 
officials also negotiated fee reductions on at least two 
occasions; in one instance WAPA claims that none of its 
officials were even present. WAPA sought and obtained 
assurance from Rounsaville that the rates were acceptable 
to FEMA officials. Apparently, Rounsaville also cleared the 
rates with John Swanson and Gerald Connolly, FEMA's 
coordinating officer in the Virgin Islands. The Hurricane 
Hugo emergency required, at least initially, quick action by 
WAPA and federal officials. 
 
We cannot agree with WAPA, however, that this evidence 
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
actions of the senior FEMA officials bound the United 
States in a contract with Gardiner. The possibility that the 
contract was implied-in-fact does not dispense with the 
requirement that those whose course of conduct show 
contractual intent have the actual authority to bind the 
government. Trauma Services, 104 F.3d at 1326. "Senior" 
officials may or may not have contracting authority; WAPA 
has come forward with nothing suggesting that those 
involved with the procurement of Gardiner's services did. 
See City of El Centro, 922 F.2d at 821 (placing burden of 
showing that government agent had requisite contracting 
authority with the party seeking to show an implied-in-fact 
contract with the government).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In some situations authority to bind the government can be implied 
"when such authority is considered to be an integral part of the duties 
assigned to a [g]overnment employee." H. Landau & Co. v. United States, 
886 F.2d 322, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting J. Cibinic & R. Nash, 
Formation of Government Contracts 43 (1982)). WAPA has not advanced 
this argument however, and has accordingly not pointed to evidence 
specifically suggesting that the authority to bind the government was 
"necessary or essential" to the duties of the federal officials involved. 
Roy 
v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 188 (1997). It seems that to the extent 
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Neither does the urgency of the situation suggest a 
different outcome. WAPA relies on Halvorson v. United 
States, 126 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Wash. 1954), in which the 
court concluded that under the emergency conditions 
created by a blizzard, the United States was responsible for 
the costs incurred when federal officials directed 
contractors to remove snow from the interior of a buildings 
that was under construction. The contractors had made 
clear that the building should not include uncovered 
ventilation slots, but the Corps of Engineers insisted that it 
should. As the contractors predicted, snow blew into the 
interior of the unfinished buildings, threatening to do 
substantial damage if it melted. The local job inspector, and 
his immediate supervisor, directed the contractors to 
remove the snow, which significantly reduced damages. The 
Corps of Engineers refused to pay for the removal. The 
court reasoned that: 
 
       Whether or not the Resident Inspector, Mr. Jackson, 
       and his supervisor, the Resident Engineer, had 
       authority to bind the government by express contract, 
       or to modify the written contract by oral agreement, 
       they did, in the emergency situation created by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
such authority was an integral part of the duties assigned to the first 
officials that arrived on the Island, it would not extend to a contract 
for 
services lasting ten weeks. Moreover, application of this doctrine is 
based 
on "the existence of some express actual authority." Id. at 189, n.18. 
Thus in Landau, the Federal Circuit concluded that two federal officials 
who had the authority to co-sign for withdrawals from a joint bank 
account that provided advance financing to government contractor, may 
have had the implied authority to bind the government. A supplier to the 
contractor sought letters from the federal officials -- who were not 
contracting officers -- guaranteeing payment from the joint bank 
account. The officials provided two such letters, the contractor did not 
pay, and the government argued that its guarantee was invalid because 
the officials lacked authority to bind it. The court concluded that the 
explicit authority to draw checks on the account, considered with the 
responsibility of finding suppliers, "may have carried with it the 
implicit 
authority to assure suppliers that they would be paid for providing the 
materials." 886 F.2d at 324. Here, WAPA has pointed to no official who 
had express actual authority, of any sort, from which further authority 
could be implied. 
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       damage done by the blizzard, have authority to direct 
       the contractors to proceed at once to minimize the 
       damage by immediate remedial action. 
 
126 F. Supp. at 900. 
 
Whatever the continuing vitality of this doctrine, it is 
inapposite here. First, in Halvorson the government and the 
plaintiffs had already entered into a contract with each 
other, duly authorized by a contracting officer of the United 
States. Payment for the snow removal would fall either to 
the government -- the party who was benefited by the 
removal and whose negligence created the problem in the 
first place -- or to the contractor had who recommended 
constructing the building so as to avoid the problem. 
 
In this case, the existence of a contractual relationship 
between Gardiner and the United States is itself at issue. 
Standard Form 270, provided by the government of the 
Virgin Islands for use in requesting reimbursements from 
the United States, explains that 
 
       FEMA is not a party to this contract. Disputes arising 
       between the parties to the contract will be resolved 
       between the contractual parties by such means are 
       available under the contract. Payment to the 
       CONTRACTOR will not be contingent upon FEMA 
       reimbursement 
 
Thus, it appears that FEMA believed that there was no 
contract between it and Gardiner and that WAPA and 
Gardiner should sort out between themselves any disputes 
over payment. Moreover, even if the government benefited 
from Gardiner's services because it owned the generators, 
WAPA's benefit was at least as substantial because 
Gardiner enabled WAPA to restore drinking water, and 
ultimately to charge its customers for that water. 
 
Moreover, despite the devastation created by Hurricane 
Hugo and the urgent need to supply a fresh water to the 
island, the policy implicit in Halvorson does not apply here. 
In Halvorson, the contractor's efforts were directed at 
removing snow as quickly as possible before a thaw melted 
the snow and destroyed the interior of the building. To this 
end it used "all of [its] men on the job and all of the men 
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they could employ in Havre," and even so some of the snow 
melted before it was removed. 126 F. Supp. 900. In this 
case, on the other hand, Gardiner provided emergency 
services for ten weeks, the provision of those services 
ultimately involved the highest level officials in WAPA, and 
the emergency brought federal officials with contracting 
powers to the Virgin Islands, although WAPA has presented 
no evidence that these officials were involved in this 
contract. If this case concerned only emergency services 
provided in the first hours or days after the hurricane, we 
would consider this claim in a different light, particularly in 
view of WAPA's evidence of significant involvement of 
federal officials in all aspects of procuring Gardiner's 
services. But the federal government reimbursed WAPA in 
the amount of $443,000, which paid for more than thefirst 
two weeks of services by Gardiner. WAPA had ten weeks 
during which it could have made sure that a contracting 
officer approved any contract between Gardiner and the 
United States or it could have asked Gardiner to 
discontinue his services. WAPA did neither. 
 
Finally, WAPA argues that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because "the Gardiner contract, whomever it 
was with, contained a term that payment would be made 
only in amounts FEMA found were reimbursable." Gardiner 
asserts that this issue was not raised in the district court 
and should not be considered on appeal. WAPA responded, 
in its reply brief, that the "evidentiary submission on this 
point in district court refutes Gardiner's contention that 
this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal." At 
oral argument, WAPA maintained that this issue had been 
raised to the district court through WAPA's disputed 
findings of fact, particular disputed fact number eight, 
submitted in opposition to Gardiner's motion for summary 
judgment. This factual submission presents evidence that 
Gardiner knew the government thought his rates were too 
high and that the government negotiated with Gardiner to 
reduce his charges. It does not, however, show that there 
was a contract term that Gardiner would be paid only those 
amounts that FEMA found to be reasonable. 
 
As a "general rule" we do not review "issues raised for the 
first time at the appellate level." United Parcel Serv. v. 
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Intern. Broth. Local No. 430, 55 F.3d 138, 140 n. 5 (3d Cir. 
1995). Although we have the discretion to review an 
argument not raised below, we will ordinarily refuse to do 
so. Id.; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-121 
(1976). WAPA's argument that "evidentiary submissions" 
supporting its new claim preserved the issue on appeal is 
essentially a claim that new arguments should be 
considered on appeal, as long as the evidence supporting 
them was submitted to the district court. In United Parcel, 
however, UPS failed to raise a legal theory -- that a clause 
of the contract violated public policy -- and we refused to 
consider that theory on appeal, although the evidence in 
support of the theory was presented to the district court. 
We considered a new legal theory for the first time on 
appeal in Salvation Army v. N.J. Dept. of Community Affairs, 
919 F.2d 183, 196 (3d Cir. 1990), but only because the 
case law on the subject had changed. 
 
WAPA has not persuaded us that this is a case in which 
we should disregard our general rule and consider on 
appeal a new argument in opposition to summary 
judgment. Nothing unusual, like an intervening change in 
the law or the lack of representation by an attorney, 
prevented WAPA from raising this issue below. This claim, 
moreover, contradicts WAPA's main argument -- that it had 
no contract with Gardiner. WAPA may have decided not to 
take such a position in the district court for fear that it 
would undermine WAPA's central claim. Under these 
circumstances, in the interest of fairness to the district 
court and to the plaintiff, not to mention the conservation 
of judicial resources, we will not consider this claim.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We will also affirm the award of pre-judgment interest. WAPA has 
argued in opposition to this award that pre-judgment interest cannot be 
awarded against the United States or against a party, like WAPA, that 
has a right to seek indemnity from the United States. Although the 
principle of sovereign immunity bars the collection of pre-judgment 
interest against the United States, courts have not extended the United 
States' sovereign immunity to a private party, even when the private 
party has an explicit indemnity agreement with the United States. See, 
e.g., Rochester Methodist Hospital v. Travelers Insurance Co., 728 F.2d 
1006, 1012-13 (8th Cir. 1984). In reaching this conclusion, the 
Rochester court reasoned that sovereign immunity bars recovery only 
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V. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district 
court's denial of WAPA's Rule 19(b) motion and we will also 
affirm the judgment in favor of Gardiner. 
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when the suit is in fact a suit against the United States; in a suit for 
damages against a government agent, it is the agent who is liable even 
if the agent then turns to the United States for reimbursement. The 
present case is in fact an easier one because WAPA does not have an 
explicit indemnity agreement with the federal authorities. For this 
reason, a verdict against WAPA does not indirectly constitute a 
determination of liability against the United States. 
 
WAPA further contends that it would be inequitable to award pre- 
judgment interest against WAPA because the non-payment to Gardiner 
was a result of FEMA's failure to pay WAPA after FEMA had assured 
WAPA that its payments to Gardiner would be reimbursed. This 
contention is merely a recharacterization of WAPA's argument that 
reimbursement by FEMA was a precondition to its duty to pay Gardiner. 
Since we have upheld the district court's entry of summary judgment for 
Gardiner, it follows that the award of pre-judgment interest is equitable. 
The district court has determined that WAPA's duty to pay on the 
contract was independent of any reimbursement agreement between 
WAPA and the US government. Whether it is equitable to award pre- 
judgment interest to Gardiner relates to the relationship between 
Gardiner and WAPA, and WAPA failed to pay on the contract when 
payment was due. 
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